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WITH THE OHIO COURTS-EDITORIAL NOTES
in its "Re-statement of the Law of Contracts".8 . Seetion 219-(1)
provides as follows:
"1. For the determination of the question whether a contract
to vary a prior contract is within the statute, :the second contract
is regarded as creating a new single contract consisting of so
many of the terms of the prior contract as the parties have not
agreed to change, and in addition the new terms on which they
have agreed."
An application of the Institute's rule to the facts of the prin-
cipal case, and those in Clark v. Guest,9 would, it seems, result
in the same judgments as reached by the court in those cases.
Similarly, if on the facts of Negley v. Jeffers,'° the terms of the
prior contract in reference to the conveyance be deemed no
longer in the modified contract, because of the actual conveyance
prior to the modification, the Institute's rule would again .give
the result reached by the court.
No generalization can decide a concrete case. Actually it can
only describe the cases that have been decided previously and
serve as a hypothesis for those arising in the future. The Insti-
tute's formulation, however, has the merit of simplicity in a
field where confusion has reigned, and where.definiteness itself
is a policy to be served, and it will be interesting to note its
effect on the future approach of our courts to the problem of the
oral modification of a contract within the statute of frauds.
JAMES L. MAGRISH.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
In l'Vills v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co.' there is
important dicta concerning the privilege which is accorded to
confidential communications between physician and patient. The
action was on a life insurance policy conditioned upon sound health
on the part of the insured on the date and at the time of delivery
8The section referred to seems to apply to the Statute of Frauds generally.
The Re-Statement does not refer to a "Statute of Frauds", such as was in-
,volved in the principal case. It is stated that the drafts of the law of con-
tracts, including this section, have been approved and are no longer confidential.
9Supra, note 4.
"°Supra, note 5.
128 Ohio App. 497 (1928).
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of the policy. The defense was that the insured was not then in
sound health. The trial court entered judgment on a verdict
for the company. The court of appeals, after finding that the
judgment was sustained by sufficient evidence of unquestioned
admissability, stated that in its view the testimony of certain
physicians, further sustaining the judgment, had been properly
received by the trial court, saying :2
"A proper interpretation of the clause of the policy which
provides that the applicant must be in sound health is, we think,
by operation of law, a waiver of the right to claim privileged
communication under the statute, and an estoppel against ob-
jection to the evidence in the trial of a cause where the insured
seeks to recover, because to hold otherwise would be to become
a partner to the constructive fraud and the instrumentality of
its perpetration."
In Baird v. Detrick,8 it was said that "the privilege conferred
by sec. 11494,' General Code, is solely for the benefit of the client,
and may be waived by the client." If that be true as to attorney
and client, it must also obtain in the case of physician and patient,
and it has been so held. In the recent case of New York Life
Insurance Company v. Snyder,' the supreme court decided that
an express waiver of the this privilege incorporated in an applica-
tion for a policy of life insurance is valid and may be enforced by
the company in a suit on such policy against all parties having
or claiming any interest therein. That is the general rule.
That the waiver may be implied is vigorously maintained by
Dean Wigmore.7 It was held otherwise in Ausdenmoore v. Holz-
back.' Subsequently, however, in the case of attorney and client,
sIbid., at p. 505.
88 Ohio App. 198, 200 (1917); motion to certify overruled, Baird v. Detrick,
15 Ohio L. R. 439, 62 WK. L. BULT. 476 (1917).
"'The following persons shall not testify in certain respects: 1. An attorney,
concerning a communication made to him by his client in that relation, or
his advice to his client; or a physician, concerning a communication made to
him by his patient in that relation, or his advice to his patient. But the at-
torney or physician may testify by express consent of the client or patient;
and if the client or patient voluntarily testifies, the attorney or physician may
be compelled to testify on the same subject; . .
'116 Ohio St. 693, 158 N. E. 176 (1927).
037 YALs L. J. 828, note.
'5 WIGMORE, BvIDENCR (2nd ed_), sec. 2388, at p. 219: "That the waiver
must be in express language is not necessary, upon any principle."
889 Ohio St. 381, 106 N. E. 41 (1914).
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the supreme court has recognized that there may be an implied
waiver by holding that an attorney for a testator, who, at the
latter's request, witnesses his will, may testify to any fact affect-
ing the validity of that instrument.9 The court indeed said that
by such request the testator "expressly consents that the at-
torney may testify". 0 That he consents, in effect, at least, is
clear enough, but that there is an express consent in any customary
sense is obviously not the fact. The consent must be implied for
it does not appear except by inference from his conduct. That
this is the real basis of the court's holding is clear from the context.
According to Dean Wigmore," "A waiver is to be predicated,
not only when the conduct indicates a plain intention to abandon
the privilege, but also when the conduct (though not evincing that
intention) places the claimant in such a position, with reference
to the evidence, that it woild be unfair and inconsistent to permit
the retention of the privilege."
The dicta quoted above from Wills v. National Life & Accident
Co. is further supported by that eminent authority who holds, 2
specifically, that "a contract of life or accident insurance ought to
be deemed an implied waiver by both parties, because otherwise
it leaves the prospects of proof for both parties a mere gamble."'"
Disclosures to a physician in his professional capacity were not
privileged at common law. The privilege is of statutory origin,
the first enactment being adopted in New York, 1828.11 Statutes
creating a privilege for communications to a physician are now
in force in about one-half of the states. The assumptions under-
lying these statutes have been vehemently assailed by Dean
Wigmore, 6 who characterizes the privilege as "a clever legerde-
main loaned by the law to the parties to suppress the truth".,
At all events there is certainly no reason to make a fetish of
the statute and exempt it from the operation of the rule that
9Knepper v. Knepper, 103 Ohio St. 529, 135 N. E. 476 (1921).
"0Ibid., p. 536.
"5 WIGMORH, op. Cit., supra, note 7, at p. 220.
"Ibid., supra, note 7, at p. 220.
"Contra: Maine v. Maryland Casualty Co., 172 Wis. 350, 178 N. E. 749
(1920), (two judges dissenting).
145 WIGMORU, op. cit., supra, note 7, sec. 2380.
"Ibid. In this connection it may be observed that the privilege may be
invoked as well as by the defendant as by the plaintiff. Maine v. Maryland
Casualty Co., supra, note 13, will serve as an example.
161bid., supra, note 7, see. 2389.
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statutes in derogation of the common law should be strictly
construed.'7 While the wisdom of that canon of interpretation
may, in general, be open to some question, there is assuredly no
ground, so long as it is adhered to, for ignoring it in connection
with the statute under discussion. 8
The attitude taken by the court in Wills v. National Life 6
Accident Insurance Company is both reasonable and fair, and,
while not supported by the cases, is consistent with settled rules
of construction and, it is submitted, should be followed.
JOSEPH O'MEARA, JR.
RULINGS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION BASED UPON EVI-
DENcE NOT DISCLOSED TO THE PARTIES.
Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, involved the
review of an order of the Utilities Commission on an application
for a certificate to operate an interstate motor bus line between
Columbus, Ohio, and Huntington, West Virginia, and a so-called
"side-loop" from Portsmouth, Ohio, to South Portsmouth, Ken-
tucky. Other carriers objected to the granting of the certificate
contending, among other things, that the application was not
made in good faith, and was a scheme to compel these operators
to purchase peace against the competition that would be offered
if the application were granted. These objections were directed
particularly against the granting of a certificate for the "side-
loop".
At the close of the commission's hearing the commissioners
announced orally that the application would be granted as prayed
for. Thereafter a written memorandum, confirming the an-
nouncement was signed by the commissioners who heard the case
and was filed. Before the certificate was actually issued, the
commissioners further considered the matter and decided to deny
the application as to the "side-loop".
'
7 Kleybolte v. Buffon, 89 Ohio St. 61, 105 N. E. 192 (1913). Cf., Hill v.
Micham, 116 Ohio St. 549, 553 (1927). "It has also been held that it is the duty
of courts, in the interpretation of statutes, unless restrained by the letter, to
adopt that view which will avoid absurd consequences, injustice, or great in-
convenience, as none of these can be presumed to have been within the legis-
lative intent. Moore v. Given, 39 Ohio St., 661."
IsCf., Myers v. State of Indiana, 137 N. E. 547, 192 Ind. 592 (1922); Howe
w. Regensburg, 132 N. Y. S. 837, 75 Misc. 132 (1911).
